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CIVIL RIGHTS-PRIVATE SCHOOL'S POLICY OF REFUSING TO ADMIT
BLACK PEOPLE SOLELY BECAUSE OF THEIR RACE VIOLATES CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1866-42 U.S.C. § 1981-Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brew-
ster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
[I]n many areas of the South efforts to eliminate segregation in
public education have 'been nullified 'by the massive withdrawal of
white children from public schools and the concomitant establishment
of a "private" school system. This movement away from public educa-
tion threatens not only -the achievements of fifteen years of integration
efforts 'but also the very legitimacy of free public education in the
South . . . . [W]hite withdrawal to segregated private schools . . .
may 'be the foremost issue in school desegregation litigation.'
The adoption of an extensive "private school" system in the south-
ern states, with a primary aim of avoiding the effect of various
Supreme Court cases banning public school segregation, has been
premised on the assumption that their "private" nature would insure
immunity from federal, and even state, remedial action. 2 Because the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause has long been held
1. Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82 YALE L.J. 1436 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Segregation Academies]: "A small number of private segre-
gated schools were established prior to 1966 to accommodate the moderate numbers of
white children who withdrew from the public schools because of the token integration
achieved under voluntary transfer plans." Id. at 1441 n.36, citing (inter alia) U.S.
COMMIsSION ON CmL RIGHTS, SouTHERN SCHOOL DESEGREGAITON 1966-1967, and Hear-
ings on Equal Educational Opportunity Before the Senate Select Comm. on Equal Edu-
cational Opportunity, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3C at 1502 (1970) (testimony of Melvyn
Leventhal, NAACP Legal Defense Fund).
The initial lack of enforcement of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954), implemented, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), is obvious from a United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare Press Release, Apr. 11, 1973, at 2, and U.S. CoMMIs-
SION ON Civi. RGms, SourEmR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 1966-1967, 7 (1967), stating
that in 1965-66, 84.9 percent of black students in the eleven southern states attended
schools which were 100 percent black. Segregation Academies, supra at 1436 n.1.
The Supreme Court, in Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968), held that
each school board had an affirmative duty to desegregate its schools. This decision
was more successful in accomplishing actual desegregation; by 1972-73 only 9.2 per-
cent of black students in the south were attending all-black schools. United States
Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare Press Release, supra.
The effect of Green on integration was paralleled by a withdrawal of white students
to private segregation academies. For example, the 56 predominantly black school dis-
tricts in Mississippi lost 40 percent of their white students between 1968 and 1971.
Segregation Academies, supra at 1451 n.81, citing Deposition of Lloyd Henderson, Di-
rector, Education Division, Office of Civil Rights, at 1-4, Plaintiffs Ex. 10, Norwood
v. Harrison, 340 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Miss. 1972), rev'd, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
2. Segregation Academies, supra note 1, at 1453.
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to apply only to "state action,"3 i.e., governmental activity, there could
be no violation of the United States Constitution if such institutions are
truly "private." In mid-1973, however, a federal district court in Vir-
ginia decided a "private schoor' case in a manner which promises the
eventual demise of the segregation academy. The case was Gonzales
v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,4 in which the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held, for the first time, that
a federal civil rights statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, proscribed a private
schoors racially discriminatory admissions policy.5
3. In 1883, the Court decided The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, in an opinion which
has been the foundation for the concept of "state action": that the fourteenth amend-
ment expresses a prohibition on actions of states which deny persons the equal protec-
tion of their laws. Id. at 11. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by state
authority, is only a private wrong which must be remedied through resort to state laws.
Id. at 17. Since 1883, this easily stated idea has been the subject of much litigation,
which has gradually seen the concept of "state action" so broadly interpreted, at least
in the last 20 years, as to prompt some commentators to announce its abolition as a
requirement for invoking the fourteenth amendment in cases of racial discrimination.
See, e.g., Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on
Equal Protection Guarantee, 66 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 855 (1966); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. Ruv. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEXAS L. REv. 347 (1963).
As to what kind of state action is prohibited, The Civil Rights Cases and subsequent
decisions have made it clear that all action by the state, whether by administrative
agencies (see, e.g., Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (health regulations pre-
scribing different treatment (separate restrooms) for black people in public restau-
rants); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907) (action of state
tax board)), the executive (Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (action of public
prosecutors)), the legislature (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (state statute for-
bidding interracial marriages); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (state
required segregation in public restaurants); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917)
(city ordinance forbidding one race from moving into areas predominantly occupied by
another race)), or the judiciary (Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court
enforcement of restrictive covenant); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (court de-
cree as due process violation)), which denies equal protection of the laws, is forbidden.
Also, the "state' has been held to include local governmental entities which effectively
act as agents of the state (see, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1958)). The
difficulty with the concept has arisen where ostensibly private actions are somehow im-
bued with state authority. Here, the Court's task is to decide whether the government
has so involved itself with the private discriminatory acts as to invoke constitutional
limitations (Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966)). Otherwise, private acts of
discrimination are not circumscribed by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. But Congress may have the power to outlaw private discrimination under
section five of the fourteenth amendment (United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966)), and Congress has the power to outlaw private discrimination against black
people under section two of the thirteenth amendment (Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968)).
4. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (1973).
5. There have been several state court cases in which blacks have sued for private
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In May of 1969, the parents of Colin M. Gonzales, both of whom
are black, read in the "yellow pages" of a day camp program offered
by Fairfax-Brewster School, a private school in Virginia. They sub-
mitted an application for the day camp, but were told that the school
was unable to accommodate them. Mr. Gonzales subsequently tele-
phoned Bobbe's Private School and was told that only white students
were accepted there. 6  Neither school had ever had a black student
enrolled at either its school or its day camp; both schools were sup-
ported entirely by student tuition and received no assistance, financial
or otherwise, from any local, state, or federal agency.7  The Gonzales'
filed suit against the schools, alleging violations of section 1981 as the
sole basis for their action."
Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal bene-
fit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
school discrimination under state civil rights statutes: Reed v. Hollywood Professional
School, 169 Cal. App. 2d 887, 338 P.2d 633 (1959) (CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West
1970) were designed to protect against discrimination in "public places" only and,
therefore, did not apply to discrimination by private schools); Crawford v. Robert L.
Kent, Inc., 167 N.E.2d 620 (Mass. 1960) (black person who was refused admission
to a Fred Astaire dance school in Boston allowed to bring suit under state law for "dis-
crimination in a place of public accommodation," the court holding that a dance
studio operated for profit would qualify as a place of public accommodation); McKaine
v. Drake Business School, Inc., 176 N.Y.S. 33 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (refusal of private busi-
ness school to admit black held to be violative of New York Civil Rights Law which
provided that, "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state shall be entitled to full
and equal accommodations .. ").
At least one case has allowed a black person to recover for discrimination by a pri-
vate school under a contract theory. In Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 120
N.W. 589 (Mich. 1909), a black medical student who had satisfactorily completed his
first year at an all white school was refused admission to the second year. The court
held that, by admitting the student and accepting his tuition, the school had created
an implied contract to allow the student to complete his course of study.
6. In August of 1972, Mrs. Sandra McCrary, also a black person, called Bobbe's Pri-
vate School to enroll her 2 year old son, Michael, in nursery school. She was likewise
told that the school accepted no black children. 363 F. Supp. at 1202.
7. Id. at 1201.
8. Colin Gonzales filed an action against Fairfax-Brewster. Mrs. McCrary, Michael
McCrary, and Colin Gonzales filed suit against Bobbe's. The sole basis for each of
the actions was 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Originally, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964) was
also invoked, but prior to trial it was withdrawn as a basis for the actions. The ac-
tions were consolidated for trial, and the Southern Independent School Association, a
group representing private white schools in seven states, was allowed to join as an inter-
vening party defendant. Id. at 1203 n.2.
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as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 
The only defense advanced by either Fairfax-Brewster or Bobbe's
was that neither school discriminated on the basis of race, and that
plaintiffs had simply failed to satisfy their respective entrance require-
ments.10 From the facts presented, -the court found in each case that
the students had in fact been excluded on the basis of race, in violation
of the statute."
The Southern Independent School Association, an intervening party
defendant representing its member all-white private schools,'2 con-
ceded that race was a factor in its policies of exclusiveness, but argued
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 could not be used to compel admission of a
black child to a segregated private school of the type which it repre-
sented. Evidence adduced by the Association, that parents who send
their children to these schools act rationally in believing that segre-
gated education is beneficial and produces superior students, with
fewer disciplinary problems, was rejected by the federal court as being
an argument of the type rejected in Brown v. Board of Education."3
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
10. 363 F. Supp. at 1202. Fairfax-Brewster advanced the argument that Colin Gon-
zales could not be admitted to its day camp because he had not demonstrated that he
was academically qualified for the first grade. The school maintained that it would
have been unfair to allow Colin to attend the summer program only to be forced to
withdraw before the beginning of the academic year. The court rejected the argument
as "unbelievable," especially since Colin had never been given a chance to demonstrate
that he was academically qualified for Fairfax-Brewster.
Bobbe's Private School claimed that it had never received phone calls from either Mr.
Gonzales or Mrs. McCrary. It maintained that the school was all-white simply because
no black person had ever filled out an application. (After Michael McCrary had been
rejected by Bobbe's, Mrs. McCrary's supervisor, a deputy Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission officer with the Navy, called Bobbe's and was told that the school
was segregated.) The court reasoned that it would have been absurd to require plain-
tiffs to have filed formal applications when they had been told that to do so would
be useless. Id. at 1203.
11. Id. at 1203-04.
12. The association represents approximately 396 academies with a total enrollment
of 176,000 students. See Segregation Academies, supra note 1, at 1448. The state or-
ganizations affiliated with the association include:
Enrollment Schools
Alabama Private School Ass'n: 22,000 65
Georgia (no statewide organization): 20,000 56
Louisiana Independent School Ass'n: 23,000 50
Mississippi Private School Ass'n: 50,000 92
North Carolina Private School Ass'n: 5,000 15
South Carolina Independent School Ass'n: 50,000 70
Virginia Independent Schools Ass'n: 11,000 47
Id. at 1448 n.70.
13. 363 F. Supp. at 1204, discussing Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). In Brown, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of "separate but equal"
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Judge Bryan, the author of the Gonzales opinion, was clearly referring
to Brown's rationale for invalidating public school segregation: that
separate (segregated) schools are inherently unequal, deprive black
children of an adequate education, and, consequently, are forbidden by
the equal protection clause.14  Thus, the schools' contention, that
benefits to the white children justified their practices, was rejected on
what would seem to be the logical corollary to the Brown holding.'8
That is, allowing white parents to independently establish segregated
schools, even though no public funds are expended, tends to accom-
plish what Brown forbade-a segregated school system.16  The diffi-
culty with this analysis, of course, is that Brown was directed at public
schools,17 a factor which was a necessary precondition for using the
equal protection clause because of its "state action" requirement. 18  In
Gonzales, the absence of state action was clear.' 9 The court more cor-
rectly could 'have reasoned by analogy that -the same principles under
which segregated public school systems are held to infringe on four-
teenth amendment guarantees2° could also be used to support the ration-
ality of a congressional judgment that private school discrimination
should be violative of federal civil rights legislation, regardless of the
motive or alleged benefits of such private policies of discrimination.
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, of which 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is a
part,2 has only recently been applied to private discrimination. The
espoused by advocates of segregated public schools violated the fourteenth amendment.
When the defendant school board failed to integrate its school after the first opinion,
the Court issued a second opinion, 349 U.S. 294 (1955), ordering that the board "make
a prompt . . . start toward compliance with . . . the May 17, 1954, ruling." Id. at 300.
14. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
15. 363 F. Supp. at 1204.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
19. 363 F. Supp. at 1201.
20. 347 U.S. at 492-95.
21. In its original form, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 & 1982 (1970) were part of section 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That all persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, . . . are hereby declared to be citizens of the
United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any
previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, . . . shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none
other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwith-
standing.
[V9ol. 7
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Act was a controversial one, passed over the veto of President Andrew
Johnson,22 and the post-Civil War Supreme Court limited its applica-
tion to cases in which state action was involved.23 As a result, the
Act was seldom invoked.
It was not until 1968 that the United States Supreme Court, in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,24 established that the Act could be invoked
even in the absence of state action. In Jones, suit had been brought
by a black person to whom a developing-company had refused to sell
a home.2 The basis of the suit was 42 U.S.C. § 1982,26 which gives
to black people the same right to purchase and to hold property as is
enjoyed 'by white people. The Supreme Court held that Congress
possessed the power, by virtue of the enabling clause of the thirteenth
amendment, 27 to prohibit discrimination in public and private property
22. The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968),
noted the history of the section. President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Act of March
27, 1866. In the congressional debate following the veto, the President characterized
the Act as overly broad. On April 6, 1866, the Senate, and on April 9, 1866, the
House, overrode the veto. Id. at 435 and accompanying notes.
23. See, e.g., Hurd v. Hodges, 334 U.S. 24, 31 (1948); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 16-17 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875). A representa-
tive lower court case is Waters v. Paschen Contractors, Inc., 227 F. Supp. 659 (N.D.
Ill. 1964). This was a class action by black bricklayers against employers and unions
for conspiracy to discriminate in hiring practices in the construction of a federal
building. The court wrote that
[i]t is well settled law that the Civil Rights Acts, Sections 1981-1983, Title 42
U.S.C., apply only to acts done under color of state law. The Constitutional au-
thority for the enactment of these statutes is found in the Fourteenth Amendment,
which unequivocally limits state action alone.
Id. at 660. The court in this case made no mention of other cases to support its sweep-
ing generalization of this "well-settled law."
24. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
25. Id. at 412.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) reads in full:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Ter-
ritory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property.
Section 1982 is the codified version of the Civil Rights Act.
27. Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within
the United States ....
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate leg-
islation.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
The Court in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), quoting The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883), noted that the thirteenth amendment "abol-
ished salvery, and established universal freedom":
mhe Enabling Clause of that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more.
For that clause clothed "Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States."
Id. See also DuBois, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82
HAnv. L. REv. 1294 (1969); The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HAIv. L. Rnv. 95
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sales.2 8  Moreover, the Court explicitly overruled Hodges v. United
States,29 a 1906 case in which the Court had refused to invoke section
1981 against a group of whites who had terrorized some black individ-
uals seeking work at a sawmill where only white people were em-
ployed.3
0
In 1969, the Court extended the application of section 1982 to mem-
bership discrimination by an essentially private recreational organiza-
tion in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.81 Little Hunting Park was
a nonstock Virginia corporation organized for recreational purposes,
under whose bylaws a person owning a membership share was en-
titled, when he rented his home, to assign his share to his tenant sub-
ject to approval of the board of directors.3 2 Sullivan, a member of
the corporation, sought to assign his membership to a black family to
whom he had rented his home. His assignment was refused, and he
was expelled from the corporation when he protested the refusal. 88
The Virginia district court had refused to apply 42 U.S.C. § 1982
because Little Hunting Park was "a private social club. 8 4  The
Supreme Court found "nothing of the kind on [the] record.8, There
was no plan or purpose of exclusiveness. It is open to every white
person within the geographic area . . . ."6 The Court did not deter-
mine what effect a showing that the defendant was a private social club
would have had on the applicability of section 1982.Y1
In the most recent Supreme Court case under the 1866 Act, Till-
(1968); Note, Civil Rights-Protection Under the Thirteenth Amendment-Housing Dis-
crimination, 20 CAsE. W. Rs. L. REv. 448 (1969).
28. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 437 (1968).
29. 203 U.S. 1 (1906), rev'd, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78
(1968).
30. The Hodges Court refused to apply the theory advanced by the government that:
"Ilhe people used in the [13th] Amendment language which this court has said permits
Congress to enact legislation operating directly to punish the acts of individuals, not
sanctioned by any color of state authority." 203 U.S. at 12.
While the Court did not specifically mention the need for state action to invoke the
1866 Act,. it refused to find that the thirteenth amendment empowered the Congress
to protect blacks from every interference with contract rights. The Court held that this
protection of individual rights belonged more properly within the state's police powers.
Id. at 16.
31. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
32. Id. at 234.
33. Id. at 234-35.
34. Id. at 235-36.
35. Id. at 236.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 237-38.
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man v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association,81 sections 1981 and
1982 were applied to private discrimination by a recreational associa-
tion. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Association operated a community
swimming pool, use of which was limited to white members and their
white guests.39 Under Wheaton-Haven's by-laws, a person residing
within a certain geographical area was entitled to membership. 40  A
black couple who bought a home in the preference area, a white
couple, members of Wheaton-Haven whose Negro guest was refused
admission to the poo, and the guest brought suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief under 42 UY.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 and the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.41  The district and appellate courts had held that
none of the statutes were applicable to the organization because it was
private.4" Relying on Sullivan, the Court unanimously held that a
clear violation of section 1982 was presented.43  The Supreme Court,
responding to a contention that a provision of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act which exempted "private clubs"'44 was also applicable in section
1982 actions, found that the association relied upon no selective ele-
ment within the defined geographic area other than race. 41 The court
therefore concluded:
.* . Wheaton-Haven is not a private club and. . . it is not necessary
to consider the issue of any implied limitation on the sweep of § 1982
when its application to a truly private club -within the meaning of
§ 2000a(c) [the exemption in the 1964 Civil Rights Act], is under
consideration.
46
By its terms, section 1982 is directed at correcting the denial to black
people of the same "right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . .
as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .,, Until Gonzales, it was
38. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
39. Id. at 433-34. The racial restrictions were formally adopted only after Negroes
applied for membership and guest privileges.
40. Id. at 433 n.3.
41. Id. at 434. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a et
seq. (1970), prohibits discrimination in places of public accommodation. See note 67
infra and accompanying text.
42. 410 U.S. at 435-37.
43. Id. at 438.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) exempts from the provisions of the 1964 Act: "[A] private
club or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that
the facilities of such establishment are made available to the [public] . .. .
45. 410 U.S. at 438.
46. Id. at 439-40.
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides in full:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
1974]
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applied primarily in the area of discrimination in employment prac-
tices, and there has been a noticeable expansion of its applicability
in this context. 8 Using it in private school discrimination cases, how-
ever, had apparently not been attempted prior to Gonzales.49  Yet en-
rolling one's child in a private school clearly appears to involve a con-
tractual relationship, in which tuition money is exchanged for education
of the child, and the application of section 1981 in this setting pre-
sents no obvious conceptual difficulties. 50 Judge Bryan concluded that
the section had the same broad scope as section 1982, so that "no
evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the se-
curity of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every
kind, and to no other.
48. See, e.g., Penn v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1973) (black employees'
allegations that federal agencies' hiring and promotional practices were racially discrimi-
natory constituted a cause of action under § 1981); Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing
Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972) (black
welder suing under § 1981 granted relief for employer's discrimination in employment
opportunities); Young v. IFT, 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971) (black sheet metal worker
allowed to sue under § 1981 for private job discrimination); Guerra v. Manchester Ter-
minal Corp., 350 F. Supp. 529 (S.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1973)
(Mexican alien allowed to bring suit under § 1981 for job discrimination by a private
employer and a union, where plaintiff was transferred to another job with fewer bene-
fits); Dobbins v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio
1968) (§ 1981 applied to job discrimination against Blacks by a labor union). But
see Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ala. 1971), in which the court
refused to apply section 1981 against a newspaper publisher who refused to print the
wedding announcement of a black couple, under the theory that section 1981 could be
applied only to state action.
Some of the more recent job discrimination cases have been based on the more spe-
cific prohibitions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), which prohibits job discrimination.
This code section, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, established the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission. Id. § 2000e-4. The Act was amended in 1972 to
give the Commission power to bring suit against a discriminatory employer, Pub. L. No.
92-261 (Mar. 24, 1972). See, e.g., EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 336 F. Supp.
273 (D. Md. 1973); EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 364 F. Supp. 1235 (W.D.N.C.
1973); EEOC v. Western Electric Co., 364 F. Supp. 188 (D. Md. 1973).
49. 363 F. Supp. at 1205 n.5. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
50. Several cases have held, at least impliedly, the relationship between a private
school and a student enrolled therein to be a contractual one: Robinson v. University
of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1958); John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 102 So. 637, 640
(Fla. 1924); People ex rel. Tinkoff v. Northwestern Univ., 77 N.E.2d 345, 349
(Mll. App. 1947), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 829 (1948); Booker v. Grand Rapids, 120
N.W. 589, 591 (Mich. 1909); Miami Military Institute v. Leff, 220 N.Y.S. 799, 808
(Buffalo .City Ct. 1926). See generally Note, The Student-School Legal Relationship:
Toward a Unitary Theory, 5 SuFFOL U.L. Rv. 468 (1970).
The court's only mention of a contractual relationship between plaintiff students and
defendant schools is in the court's notation that, "[i]f read literally ...[§ 1981] covers
these plaintiffs, who have been denied their right to make a contract with the defend-
ants because they are not white." 363 F. Supp. at 1203.
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state action is necessary to invoke § 1981.""' This rationale is amply
supported by the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Jones and Till-
man52 and by the fact that the two sections were originally part of
the same act of Congress, so that section 1981 is ostensibly applicable
even in the non-"state action" (private) arena.53
The key question left open with respect to section 1981 is whether
there are any limits to its application. Does it forbid any white person
to refuse to contract for racial reasons with any black person in any
and all possible contractual situations? Does it apply -to places of pub-
lic accommodations or, to put it another way, did the 1964 Civil Rights
Act merely afford a different remedy for a right already long existent?
Does section 1981 outlaw white private fraternities and clubs estab-
lished on a discriminatory basis?
Gonzales extends section 1981 to a new area-private schools-but
perhaps even more important, the Court's conclusion suggests that the
scope of section 1981 will not be easily contained.54 In response
to the idea that the schools were "truly private" the court was not satis-
fied to conclude that there was no method of selection of students
"'other than race;' "I it went on to state that, "[T]he [1964] act is
npt a limitation on § 1981, and consequently the exemption of 42
U.S.C. § 2000(e) for private establishments does not apply in this
case."
56
If section 1981 was actually intended to apply to private discrimi-
natory activity, as the Jones Court said section 1982 was intended to
do,57 such discussion of the private or non-private nature of the de-
fendant would not seem necessary. It should be enough that the court
has determined that discrimination is present, and that an apparently
non-governmental entity was responsible. A more correct analysis in
the Gonzales context would have simply noted that the "private" na-
ture of the organization was irrelevant because section 1982 (and thus
1981), as interpreted in Jones, applied regardless of its private or pub-
lic nature.5" The approach (and the language) utilized by Judge
51. 363 F. Supp. at 1204; Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F.
Supp. 392, 397 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
52. 392 U.S. at 423-26; 410 U.S. at 437-39.
53. 410 U.S. at 439-40; Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls, 368 F. Supp.
392, 395 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
54. 363 F. Supp. at 1203-04.
55. Id. at 1204.
56. Id. at 1205.
57. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438 (1968).
58. Id. at 423-24.
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Bryan apparently was derived from Justice Douglas' opinion in Sulli-
van, wherein he rebutted the argument that section 1982 did not apply
because of the exemption for "private social clubs," by asserting that
the use of race as the sole basis for exclusiveness was an insufficient
criteria, standing alone, for a "private club."5  Justice Douglas' re-
spouse in Sullivan was derived from Daniel v. Paul,0 a case which in-
terpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as to its exemption for private
clubs from the Act's ban on racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation.6 1  Use of language from a case decided on a statute
quite distinct from section 1982, especially where there was no argu-
ment ostensibly advanced on the 1964 Act in Sullivan, makes the possi-
59. 396 U.S. at 236. One recent lower court decision, Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F.
Supp. 1143 (S.D. Tex. 1970), set out the criteria for a private club:
(1) An organization which has permanent machinery established to carefully
screen applicants for membership and who selects or rejects such applicants ... ;
(2) which limits the use of the facilities and the services of the organization strictly
to members . . .; (3) which organization is controlled by the membership . . ;
(4) which organization is non-profit and operated solely for the benefit and pleasure
of the members; and (5) whose publicity, if any, is directed solely and only to
members for their information and guidance.
Id. at 1153.
Factors by which the federal courts have found clubs to be non-private include: (1)
lack of true exclusiveness, in which an organization is open to all comers, white skin
being the only membership requirement: Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n,
410 U.S. 431, 438 (1973); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236
(1969); Stout v. YMCA, 404 F.2d 687, 688 (5th Cir. 1968); Nesmith v. YMCA, 397
F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex.
1970); United States v. Jordan, 302 F. Supp. 370, 377 (E.D. La. 1969); United States v.
Clarksdale King & Anderson Co., 288 F. Supp. 792, 795 (N.D. Miss. 1965); United
States v. Jack Sabin's Private Club, 265 F. Supp. 90, 94 (E.D. La. 1967); United States
v. Northwest Louisiana Restaurant Club, 256 F. Supp. 151, 153 (W.D. La. 1966);
Lackey v. Sacoolas, 191 A.2d 395, 396-97 (Pa. 1963); (2) a purely commercial opera-
tion: Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301 (1969); United States v. Richberg, 398 F.2d
523, 526-28 (5th Cir. 1968); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex.
1970); United States v. Johnson Lake, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1376, 1379 (S.D. Ala. 1970);
Bell v. Kenwood Golf & Country Club, 312 F. Supp. 753, 757-59 (D. Md. 1970). For
general discussions of criteria for "private clubs," see "Public Accommodations," in
M. Kom=rz & T. LusKus, A CENTURY OF Crvi. RIGrS ch. 6 (1961); Note, Public
Accommodations: What is a Private Club?, 30 MoNT. L. Rv. 47 (1969); Note, Public
Accommodations Lmvs and the Private Club, 54 GEo. L.J. 915 (1966).
The court's statement in Gonzales that Sullivan had "abolished traditional notions of
what is 'private' insofar as these [civil rights] types of actions are concerned" (363 F.
Supp. at 1205), is contradicted by the abundance of cases in which lack of exclusiveness
other than race had been held, in lower court opinions preceding Sullivan, to evidence
non-private organization.
Both Fairfax-Brewster and Bobbe's would be easily classified as non-private under
the criteria established above, since both advertised in the yellow pages (id. at 1202)
and neither had admission requirements which were apparently enforced routinely,
other than race. See id. at 1204.
60. 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
61. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
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bility of confusion very likely.02  The defendants in Tillman, specifi-
cally raised the issue that this private club exemption of the 1964 Act
applied, and thus precluded section 1982's applicability,"' but the
Supreme Court followed the dictates of Sullivan, and thus Daniel v.
Paul, and concluded that in fact the recreational association was not
truly private.64  Consequently, the issue of whether section 1982 was
somehow restricted by the 1964 Act was not decided in Tillman.
Judge Bryan's opinion seemed to reflect a belief -that the preceding
Supreme Court cases, Sullivan and Tillman, rested to some extent on
a determination of such "non-privateness," whereas it appears that this
determination was made, or should have been in Sullivan, only in re-
sponse to a defense argument based on the 1964 Act's exemption. 5
There was no such argument advanced in Gonzales, although Judge
Bryan did make a point of saying that the private club provision would
not have aided the schools because of the racial basis for their "pri-
vateness." 66
It is difficult to see how Judge Bryan could have reached any other
conclusion, for the primary aim of the 1964 Act was to secure equal-
ity of treatment in facilities of "public accommodation," i.e., those asso-
ciated with -travel, sustenance, or recreation. But even if a public
accommodation were involved, the intent of the legislature to expand
rather than limit civil rights in enacting the 1964 Act is apparent from
a saving clause in the act itself: "[N]othing in this subchapter shall
preclude any individual from asserting any right based on any other
federal or state law not inconsistent with this subchapter. .... ,s
62. 396 U.S. at 237-38.
63. 410 U.S. at 438.
64. Id.
65. 396 U.S. at 237-38.
66. 363 F. Supp. at 1205.
67. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1970)) prohibits
many specific forms of public discrimination and outlaws discrimination in places of
public accommodations. Other portions cover public facilities (id. § 2000b), public ed-
ucation (id. § 2000c), federally assisted programs (id. § 2000d), employment oppor-
tunities (id. § 2000e), registration and voting statistics (id. § 2000f), community rela-
tions service (id. § 2000g), and miscellaneous provisions (id. § 2000h).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b). Lower federal courts have consistently recognized that
the 1964 Act did not preempt the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See Long v. Ford Motor Co.,
352 F. Supp. 135 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (a black person brought suit against a for-
mer employer under section 1981, and it was held that the Civil Rights Act of 1964
did not preempt section 1981). Accord, Boureaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting
Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971).
The courts have not yet decided whether or not a true private club, which has a
legitimate basis of membership or affiliation, other than or in addition to the racial
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A companion defense raised in Gonzales is a first amendment argu-
ment based upon the freedom of association of members of private
groups.6 9 It appears that, to date, no Supreme Court decisions have
specifically decided whether or not the right to freedom of association
permits private organizations to exclude members on the basis of
race.70
exclusiveness, could be affected by sections 1981 or 1982. Such a situation was presented
in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), where it was effectively con-
ceded that the Lodge's limitations on members and guests, to Caucasians only, was not
its sole reason for existence. Id. at 171. A refusal to admit the black guest of a mem-
ber was attacked on the theory that state action was implicated in the discrimination
because the Lodge possessed a state-issued liquor license, which resulted in the state's
extensive involvement with the Lodge pursuant to its power of regulation of licensees.
Id. The Court held (6-3) that this was insufficient state entanglement with the Moose
Lodge to require the operation of the equal protection clause. Id. at 171-72. If one
views the membership in a private club as a contractual situation (see, e.g., Comment,
Association, Privacy and the Private Club: The Constitutional Conflict, 5 HARv. CIV.
RIGHTS-CIV. LiB. L. REv. 460, 462 & nn. 11-12 (1970); Note, Constitutional Law-Pri-
vate Club Discrimination, 1970 Wis. L. Rev. 595, 605-06), then section 1981 should ap-
ply. As to the guest situation, a standing issue would be involved because seeking ad-
mittance in this capacity does not involve any but the most attenuated of "contracts."
This issue could have been decided in Tillman because of the presence of a plaintiff-
member whose basis of complaint was denial of admission to his black guest and be-
cause the guest herself was also a plaintiff. See text accompanying notes 38-46 supra.
Because the lower court had dismissed their action solely on the theory of the associa-
tion's private nature, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether or not
there was a sufficient contractual relationship for section 1981 to apply. Nevertheless, it
would appear that, from the viewpoint of a contractual analysis, the member is the per-
son to assert the denial of the right, under the membership contract, to bring any guest
he wishes regardless of their race.
69. The Southern Independent School Association supported its argument that section
1981 should not be applied to purely private actions with misquoted dicta from Norwood
v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973):
(although) the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, (it places no value on
discrimination) .... (Invidious) private discrimination may be characterized as
a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the First Amendment,
(but it has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protections.)
Id. at 469-70, quoted at 363 F. Supp. at 1204, with portions in parenthesis omitted by
the defendants in Gonzales.
Norwood was a unanimous opinion in which the Court held that a Mississippi
textbook program which allowed private segregated schools to use state supplied text-
books violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
70. The fundamental issue as to whether there is constitutional protection for the
right of an organization to discriminate in selecting its members was faced in Railway
Mall Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945). The New York Civil Rights Law prohibited
labor organizations from denying membership or services based upon race, color, or
creed. The union in that case maintained that the law violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that there was
no constitutional protection for the union's discrimination. Id. at 94-97.
A number of lower court cases have raised the issue in dicta: Sims v. Order of
United Commercial Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112, 113-14 (D. Mass. 1972)
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Freedom of association is not specifically guaranteed by the Consti-
tution. Formal recognition of -the right came in 1958 in NAACP
v. Alabama,71 where the NAACP had been fined for contempt after
refusing to produce membership lists pursuant to the state's foreign
corporation registration statute. It had been suggested that a constitu-
tionally protected right to freedom of association might be found in
either the first or fifth amendments. 72  The Supreme Court, in hold-
ing the statute unconstitutional, based its decision on the first amend-
ment:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "lib-
erty" assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
which embraces freedom of speech. Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action which
may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject
to close scrutiny.7
3
In deciding whether state regulation of, or interference with, a pri-
vate organization amounts to violation of this right, the Supreme Court
("we know of no authority for the proposition that membership in a private organiza-
tion may be secured by suit under the civil rights statutes"); Wesley v. City of Savan-
nah, 294 F. Supp. 698 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (use of a municipal golf course for an all-white
function was held to be in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, although the court
mentioned that formation of a private club was merely one expression of freedom of
association). See also STP Corp. v. United States Auto Club, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 146
(S.D. Ind. 1968). An employee of STP was seeking an injunction against the club for
not allowing his turbine engine car to enter into competition. The court noted that
"[clourts will not interfere with the internal affairs of an association except in case of
fraud, illegality or violation of a civil right." Id. at 170.
Cases involving discrimination by private clubs have generally been concerned with
whether there was enough government participation to make the discrimination viola-
tive of the fourteenth amendment (see Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 171 (1972)),
or, lacking government participation, whether the club could factually qualify under the
private club exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See note 44 supra.
71. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The constitutional right to freedom of association was
referred to several times prior to its formal enunciation in 1958. See Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds,
339 U.S. 382, 409 (1950); A.F. of L. v. American Sash Co., 335 U.S. 538, 546 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927). See
generally Note, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and
Right to Privacy, 1970 DuKE L.J. 1181, 1190 [hereinafter referred to as Private Club
Discrimination].
72. 357 U.S. at 460.
73. Id. at 460-61 (citations omitted). The first amendment reads in pertinent
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting . . . the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble . . . ." The Supreme Court has held that this freedom of assembly in-
cludes freedom of association. See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960).
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has generally applied a balancing test.74 The rights of a group and
its members to be free from interference is weighed against the gov-
ernmental interests involved.75  The interests most strongly calling for
non-intervention seem to be those most closely related to rights specifi-
cally mentioned in the first amendment. For instance, a New York
statute requiring the Ku Klux Klan to submit its membership lists was
upheld on -the grounds that the Klan's activities involved unlawful vio-
lence and intimidation, 76 whereas similar disclosure statutes have
been found invalid as against civil rights organizations whose interests
are legal, as well as being specifically protected as freedom of expres-
sion under the first amendment.
77
Freedom of association is a less viable defense to the application
of section 1981 than to the application of any state law, since section
1981 was promulgated under the enabling clause of the thirteenth
amendment.78 Thus, two constitutionally protected rights are pitted
against one another: the right to freedom from slavery guaranteed by
the thirteenth amendment and expanded into the right to racial equality
in contracting versus the first amendment right to freedom of associa-
tion.79 Dicta in several Supreme Court cases suggest that the Court
74. 357 U.S. at 466.
75. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), the Court held a Virginia statute
prohibiting solicitation of business by attorneys to be in violation of the first and four-
teenth amendments as applied to the members and attorneys of the NAACP. The
Court balanced the state's interests against those of the NAACP:
[AlIthough the petitioner has amply shown that its activities fall within the First
Amendment's protections, the State has failed to advance any substantial regula-
tory interest, in the form of substantive evils flowing from petitioner's activities,
which can justify the broad prohibitions which it has imposed.
Id. at 444.
Similarly, in discussing the issue of whether Alabama's statutes governing disclosure
of names of members in an organization violated the fourteenth amendment, the Court
in NAACP v. Alabama said:
We turn to the final question whether Alabama has demonstrated an interest in
obtaining the disclosures it seeks from petitioner which is sufficient to justify the
deterrent effect which we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the
free exercise by petitioner's members of their constitutionally protected right of as-
sociation.
357 U.S. at 463.
76. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63 (1928). See Communist Party v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (Subversive Activities Control Act require-
ment of registration of communist party organizations held valid since the danger to
members caused by registration was overridden by the interest in national security).
77 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 543-46
(1963); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357
U.S. 449 (1958). See Private Club Discrimination, supra note 71, at 1192.
78. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
79. There is some authority for the proposition that freedom of association was
meant to assure only the full effectuation of express first amendment rights, rather than
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views the right of a truly private organization to exclude members on
the basis of race to be a protected one. For example, in Evans v.
Newton, ° Justice Douglas wrote that "[a] private golf club, however,
restricted to either Negro or white membership is one expression of
freedom of association."81  Two years prior to Evans, Justice Goldberg
noted in Bell v. Maryland"2 that "prejudice and bigotry in any form
are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right of every person to close
his home or club to any person or to choose his social intimates and
business partners solely on the bases of personal prejudices including
race."
88
On the other hand, dictum in the most recent case, Norwood v. Har-
rison,"4 indicates that the Court views the right of association as one
subject to some limitations:
[A]lithough the Constitution does not proscribe private bias, it places
no value on discrimination . . . . Invidious private discrimination
may be characterized as a form of exercising freedom of association
protected by the First Amendment, but it has never been accorded af-
,firmative constitutional protections.8 5
In Norwood, a unanimous Court held that a Mississippi textbook pro-
gram which allowed private segregated schools to use state supplied
text books violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.86
The strongest interest being balanced against private segregation
academies' freedom of association right to exclude black students
seems to be the interest of the federal government in racial equality
in education. The detrimental effects of segregated education, as de-
to protect the rights of private organizations. See Wright, The Constitution on the
Campus, 22 VAND. L. REv. 1027, 1039 (1969); Note, Freedom of Association: Con-
stitutional Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA. L. REV. 730, 752 (1960).
80. 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
81. Id. at 299.
82. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
83. Id. at 313 (Goldberg, J., concurring). Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551
(1896):
The argument [that enforced separation of the races stamps the "colored race"
with a badge of inferiority] also assumes that social prejudices may be overcome
by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the Negro except by en-
forced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the
two races are to meet upon terms of social equality, it must be the result of nat-
ural affinities, a mutual appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary con-
sent of individuals.
84. 413 U.S. 455 (1973). See note 69 supra.
85. 413 U.S. at 469-70.
86. Id. at 468-70. See note 69 supra.
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scribed in Brown, are accomplished by a flight to private segregation
academies as well as by direct segregation in the public schools.8 7  Es-
pecially in view of the proliferation of private academies after the var-
ious school desegregation cases,"" the constitutional rights of all cit-
izens to an equal education would be thwarted if segregation academies
are allowed to continue to discriminate in their membership require-
ments.
In view of the Court's recent expressions in Norwood and the detri-
mental impact which segregation academies have had on the notion
of integrated public schools, the defense of freedom of association
would seem to be misplaced in the private school context. Moreover,
the "right" of private clubs to discriminate cannot be said to assume
constitutional proportions. If consenting adults cannot be permitted
to see "obscene" films (despite the absence of a victim) lest the pub-
lic be "offended" and the environment be detrimentally affected,80
then (particularly in the light of the thirteenth amendment) it is
difficult to see why discriminatory private clubs should be protected, for
they do create victims and they, in the judgment of Congress as expressed
in the Civil Rights statutes, equally offend public morals. To presume
that Congress is constitutionally prevented from outlawing this tortious
behavior, however "private," seems questionable at best.
CONCLUSION
A hundred year old statute, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
was seldom invoked until Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. in 1968, has
87. Decreased enrollment in public schools, caused by the flight of white students
to segregation academies, causes a reduction of state funds for local systems. In most
southern states, aid from the state to local school districts is based on attendance. See,
e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 52, § 207(2) (Supp. 1971); GA. CODE ANN. ch. 32-6 (1969); Miss.
CoDE ANN. §§ 6248-01 to 6248-26 (Supp. 1972).
Transfers of experienced teachers and administrators have also occurred in many dis-
tricts with private academies. In Louisiana, between 1962 and 1967, 35 percent of the
teachers in segregation academies came from the public schools. Poindexter v. Lou-
isiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833, 851 (E.D. La. 1967). In
areas in which the public schools have been almost completely resegregated, white
teacher switchover has apparently been significant. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S.
455, 467 n.9 (1973).
For the impact of segregation academies on the public school system in general, see
Segregation Academies, supra note 1, at 1450.
88. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. "The estimated enrollment in Southern
private schools organized or expanded in response to desegregation increased from
roughly 25,000 in 1966 to approximately 535,000 by 1972." Segregation Academies,
supra note 1, at 1441.
89. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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been applied for the first time against racial discrimination by private
segregation academies. In holding that the Act, in the present form of
42 U.S.C. § 1981, applied to such discrimination despite the absence of
state action, the federal district court in Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster
School, Inc. has provided a powerful tool for civil rights advocates. If
the court's holding is upheld in the appellate courts, it may well mark
an end to the long series of ruses which have been employed to avoid
school integration." Moreover, Gonzales would appear to be part of an
ongoing trend to interpret the old Civil Rights statutes in a way that
would suggest that all forms of "private" discrimination are offensive to
those discriminated against, to the general public, and to the laws of the
United States.
Teresa A. Clark
90. For a good discussion of the resistance to school desegregation in the southern
states, see Segregation Academies, supra note 1; Note, Post-Brown Private White
Schools-An Imperfect Dualism, 26 VAND. L. Rnv. 587 (1973); Note, The Courts,
HEW, and Southern School Desegregation, 77 YALE L.J. 321 (1968).
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